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Abstract 
This paper looks at the possibility of a return to one’s essence through a comparative exposition of 
some fundamental themes in both Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s ambivalence to modernity. Central 
to Nietzsche for example is an immanent critique of modernity, attempting to retrieve man from the 
snares of the modern culture. Heidegger on the other hand, sets forth an immanent questioning of 
historicity, attempting to recover the truth about man from the concealment of the technocratic 
culture. Whereas a genealogy of morality affords Nietzsche a basis by which to retrieve man from 
the tragedy caused by a bifurcated sense of life (oscillating between the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian arts), a hermeneutical phenomenology of the historicity and temporality of man allows 
Heidegger to recover the truth about man from the “tragic double bind” that ensues from the 
technocratic culture’s trappings and manipulation of physis. While Nietzsche’s genealogy of 
morality offers a moment of critical retrieval by which an understanding of man’s condition is made 
pronounced as essentially alienated from one’s nature, Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology 
provides a temporal recovery of truth through which a creative appreciation of man’s relation with 
physis is made visible. In as much as Nietzsche offers a return to man’s nature through an 
overcoming of the sense of the tragic via an immanent critique, so Heidegger as well, offers a return 
to man’s essence by appropriating man and the physis via immanent questioning. As Nietzsche 
situates his immanent critique within the genealogy of man’s tragic sense of morality, and thus 
promises a return to one’s nature, so Heidegger does the same and situates his questioning within 
the tragic sense of truth encapsulated in man’s works of arts. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nietzsche and Heidegger are ambivalent to modernity. Central to Nietzsche 
for example is an immanent critique of modernity, attempting to retrieve man 
from the entrenchment of the modern culture.
1 Heidegger on the other hand, sets 
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forth an immanent questioning of historicity, attempting to recover the truth 
about man from the concealment of the technocratic culture.
2 Whereas  a 
genealogy of morality affords Nietzsche a basis by which to retrieve man from 
the tragedy caused by a bifurcated sense of life (oscillating between the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian arts), a hermeneutical phenomenology of the 
historicity and temporality of man allows Heidegger to recover the truth about 
man from the “tragic double bind” that ensues from the technocratic culture’s 
trapping and manipulation of physis. While Nietzsche’s genealogy of morality 
offers a moment of critical retrieval by which an understanding of man’s 
condition is made pronounced as essentially alienated from one’s nature, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology provides a temporal recovery of 
truth through which a creative appreciation of man’s relation with physis is 
made visible. In as much as Nietzsche offers a return to man’s nature through an 
overcoming of the sense of the tragic via an immanent critique, so Heidegger as 
well, offers a return to man’s essence by appropriating man and the physis via 
immanent questioning. As Nietzsche situates his immanent critique within the 
genealogy of man’s tragic sense of morality, and thus promises a return to one’s 
nature, so Heidegger does the same and situates his questioning within the tragic 
sense of truth encapsulated in man’s works of arts.  
These parallel themes are roughly construed. I am rather uncertain as to 
whether they are indeed of such nature. I shall try to explore how far they can be 
demonstrated to be important themes within the context of the human condition. 
 
2. A Genealogy of the Present: Significant Divides 
 
The human condition is condemned to self-destruct, to totally annihilate 
itself. There are reasons to believe that it is in fact gearing towards that direction. 
Part of the reason perhaps bears a closer connection to one’s sense of morality, 
the other part, to one’s sense of technology. Unarguably, had one a sense of 
morality or a sense of technology, the human condition might be fated or 
destined to something other than its own destruction. It might have been, in 
effect, a return to man’s nature thereby preserving the human condition.  
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The human condition is doomed. It is built upon the dialectic of the pre-
ordained beauty and order that emerge from man’s illusions of timeless forms 
and appearances while the arbitrary, the ugly and the beast, or the ‘real’ of the 
human condition, prowl behind. This sense of pre-ordained beauty and order, a 
trace of the Apollonian art, likewise steps in and creates a moral universe of 
unassailable meanings and conditions of moralizing at the expense of the 
banality of everyday morality. I suppose, through the coupling of art and 
morality, an Apollonian symbolic order ensues, an art of morality and a morality 
of order and beauty. Within this symbolic order however, the irresistible urge to 
break loose lurks. The natural urge that drives man to be the Dionysian that he is, 
as he imagines himself transfixed within a horizon of unmitigated suffering and 
absurdity of existence. The urge that drives man to imagine and create 
essentially that sense of insecurity, of frailty, or the anticipated sense of nausea 
of the human condition. He is thus trapped within the narrative of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian. As such he finds himself ordained with such 
desire for the beautiful and the chaotic as well as for the reverent and the 
irreverent. 
 Man’s reverence for his own existence, for example, by being lured to the 
Apollonian art, indicates how far-flung he has forgotten his own dynamic moral 
bearing. He has lost that sense of immanent critique that Nietzsche spoke of, on 
account of the sheer appearances or visible forms of the moral intoxications of 
the Apollonian symbolic order, which is emblematic and figurative of order and 
perfection. The symbolic nature of the Apollonian art as perfection, demystifies 
that moral bearing into an idealized image of the moral man thereby creating a 
moral universe characterized by disconnections from their conditions of 
applicability. By subsuming man into the dreams and fancies of perfection, man 
is lured into an inner world of fantasy, of dreams, of illusions, symbolic of all 
plastic arts, while “the incompletely intelligible everyday world” lurks behind. 
In The Birth of the Tragedy for example, Nietzsche writes: 
 
The beautiful appearance of the dream-worlds, in creating which every 
man is perfect, is the prerequisite of all plastic arts, […] In our dreams we 
delight in the immediate apprehension of form; all forms speak to us; none 
are unimportant, none are superfluous. But, when this dream-reality is 111 
 
most intense, we also have, glimmering through it, the sensation of its 
appearance.
3 
 
The delight that man takes in the sensations that arise from this Apollonian 
symbolism, the unfathomable belief that he can be perfect, makes him the 
Apollonian god he dreams to be, capable of erecting images, appearances and 
forms to the detriment of the life energies that surround the human condition. As 
the Apollonian god that he is, he turns away from the intelligible present and 
hides in the illusions of control arising from the sublimity that embeds in the 
“joy and wisdom of the apollonian appearances of perfection”.
4 To the effect 
that man considers himself the Apollonian god he is by erecting such phantoms 
and fancies, a world of dreams, so to speak, he believes he has escaped all the 
nausea that befits life. An escape from life’s seeming contradictions and 
tragedies, from pain and suffering that arise from the fear of the 
meaninglessness of the human condition, the conditions of the Dionysian man. 
By becoming the Apollo himself, by turning into the god of all plastic arts, he 
thinks he has conquered such contradictions and has triumphed over the 
Dionysian reality. Nietzsche for example writes: 
 
Apollo dispels the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification 
of the eternity of the phenomenon: here beauty triumphs over the 
suffering inherent in life; pain is in a sense obliterated from the features 
of nature.
5 
 
Nietzsche however recognizes, that despite the beatific sense of life the 
Apollonian representation of perfection brings to man, as man is temporarily 
removed from the intelligible, contingent and fragmentary activities that govern 
the present by living into an illusion of escape from its banality, the Apollonian 
representation of timeless appearances such as beauty and perfection, is also an 
“analogon” for a possible affirmation of life.
6 Matthew Rampley for example 
notes that “Nietzsche’s Apollonian form supplements the essential lack of 
negativity at the base of existence”.
7  While the Dionysian symbolism of the 
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imagined nausea and pessimism of the human condition are made hidden by this 
apollonian turning, Nietzsche nonetheless makes the apparent opposition and 
contradiction as a site for a possible affirmation and return to one’s nature. Keith 
Pearson and Duncan Large for example explain: 
 
For Nietzsche, the task is one of articulating a pessimism of strength and 
of locating the origin of tragedy in overflowing health and fullness of life, 
within which the affliction of life is not viewed as a mere curse but as a 
promise.
8 
 
The imagined sense of nausea and the pessimism that symbolizes the 
Dionysian art, in contrast to the Apollonian symbolic order, reflects the banality 
of the human condition. It is a condition of Heracliteian flux, of the frequently 
changing features of the daily contingencies of human existence, a state of 
temporal activity, a moment of fleeting “presents” where various pessimistic 
tendencies are within man’s reach. Within the Dionysian art, Nietzsche grounds 
the possibility of affirmation of the transitoriness of human existence, along with 
its various drives, including the drives for destruction and war. Nietzsche thus, 
through the Dionysian art articulates, in effect, “the rejection of everything 
permanent” and affirmation of becoming, of a return to one’s nature despite the 
tragic sense that characterizes life itself.
9 Nietzsche aptly puts it: 
 
In Dionysian art and symbolism the same nature cries to us with its true, 
undissembled voice: “Be as I am! Amidst the ceaseless flux phenomena I 
am the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally impelling to 
existence, eternally self-sufficient amid this flux of phenomena.
10 
 
The symbolic opposition thus between the Apollonian and the Dionysian not 
only probes the confines of the arcane and the naïve but also transcends those 
limits in order to create meanings, representations and realities of the imagined 
nauseous predicaments of the human condition.
11 At the heart of this symbolic 
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opposition, nevertheless, Nietzsche recognizes the apriority of a universe of 
intelligible meanings, realities and values which are already pre-ordained by the 
symbolic order. Thus, he finds himself within the same existential dilemma 
lurking the human condition – the dilemma of finding the meaning, the value as 
well as the reality of life. In effect, by introducing the great divide between the 
Apollonian illusions of timeless perfection and the Dionysian reality of fleeting 
arbitrariness, Nietzsche attempts to retrieve, within these boundaries of total 
resignation, nihilism and mediocrity, the will to live or the return to one’s nature 
in the midst of such divide.  
Heidegger in the same way faces a similar predicament. Given the pre-
ordained meanings evident in the human condition, he finds himself asking the 
same question. What is the meaning of being? What is truth? How can truth 
reveal itself if its meaning were pre-ordained? 
Heidegger’s response, similar to Nietzsche, is situated in the tragic sense of 
the concealed truth, which is hidden in the work-object divide of art. Just as 
Nietzsche’s attempt of retrieval is fuelled by the belief in the eternal return, 
Heidegger’s attempt of recovering the truth is propelled by the belief in the 
clearing of the eventual revealing of the truth. He sets out his answers though 
within the works of arts in so far as he regards these works as primal examples 
of the event of truth.
12 He however makes a distinction between an object of art 
and work of art just as Nietzsche does between the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian arts. 
Heidegger’s symbolic divide or semantic bifurcation between what is an 
object of art and a work of art is essentially revealing. At one point, it reveals the 
artist. At another point, it reveals the artwork. Still, it also reveals the art itself. 
Whatever its worth nonetheless, the revealing itself is significant as much as it is 
also an event of concealment. It conceals the artist, not only his art, revealing 
only the work, by virtue of which the artist becomes what he is.
13 Thus, in work 
of art, there is a happening, an event-ation, a bringing-forth of truth, whatever it 
is. This bringing-forth or event-ation, or the happening of truth sets itself forth 
only through clearing or what he himself calls the disclosure.
14 Disclosure 
however takes place as well only if one were attuned with what is happening.
15 
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One’s familiarity with the work of arts, for example, might be possibly thought 
of as an attunement. Heidegger often speaks of attunement as an essential mood 
of being there. Yet, I am saying that familiarity with the work of art is an 
attunement. It leads to a fundamental questioning of the nature of the art itself, 
let alone the greatness of the work of art. Heidegger thus grounds his immanent 
questioning in this way. He sets himself the task of differentiating the thing from 
the work in the hope that such differentiation might lead to the disclosure of the 
truth itself. In The Origin of the Work of Art for example, Heidegger writes: 
 
[…] the art work is something else over and above the thingly element. 
This something else in the work constitutes its artistic nature. The art 
work is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other than 
the mere thing itself is, alloagoreuei. The work makes public something 
other than itself; it manifests something other: it is an allegory. In the 
work of art something other is brought together with the thing that is 
made.
16 
 
The idea that there is something other than the work or the mere thing, for 
Heidegger sets a possible disclosure of the truth. While it is prima facie evident 
that man is familiar already with works of art, it is also evident that one 
recognizes that there is something other in the works themselves aside from their 
being objects of art. As objects of art, man does not really pay attention to how 
they come to be or what they are in themselves so long as they serve their 
purposes as mere objects or tools. Man bothers not to inquire whether there is 
more to them than being instruments or objects as well as things that man 
fancies about. More often, man does not really give much credit to them 
especially so when they have outlived their usefulness or equipmental quality, 
that is, when they are no longer reliable. When things are no longer reliable, the 
truth that it carries and brings forth, whatever truth there is, hides into the 
oblivion of one’s forgetting of truth. Thus, Heidegger is faced with the question, 
how shall it be grasped or recovered from such tragic sense of forgetfulness and 
concealment? Within the boundaries of forgetfulness, concealment, familiarity, 
and attunement, how shall it be recovered if in itself, the truth loves to hide? 
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3. In the Beginning Was Concealment: Instinct and Thing 
 
There is lamentably a certain degree of concealment of will and truth in the 
discussions earlier introduced. In Nietzsche, there is an apparent concealment of 
the will, as the will is forced to oscillate between the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian aesthetic cultures. He finds himself unable to articulate, in effect, the 
difficulty of having to decide for himself the kind of life he wishes to live. Either 
he gives in to the illusions of perfection and order perpetuated by his Apollonian 
tendencies or succumbs to the arbitrariness of his Dionysian lineage. In either 
case, he finds himself already immersed within the pre-ordained world of beauty, 
values and morality and unable to create for himself the sort of beauty, values or 
morality he finds meaningful. In Heidegger, there is also an apparent 
concealment of the truth, as truth is hidden in the object-work divide of art. Man 
is unable to discover this truth as he is absorbed as well within the pre-ordained 
systems of distinctions between objects, works, and arts – in short, things. He 
finds himself already in a world of things with pre-ordained distinctions. Either 
he discovers the truth about the object and finds that it is only a thing carved out 
of nature or he seeks the truth about the work and finds out that it is only a thing 
with a utility value. In either case, he finds himself already in a world of things, 
with things and unable to discover for himself the truth about himself as well as 
the truth about the thing. He is so immersed that he thrusts into the depths of 
things without questioning as to whether there is any truth in the thing. It may be 
asked though, how is such concealment possible? How did it arise? 
The concealment of the will in Nietzsche is pre-ordained by custom and 
tradition and so is the truth of Heidegger. The culture that arises, for example, 
from the Apollonian-Dionysian divide begins with the establishment of customs 
and practices. Customs and practices, in this regard, set forth a world of 
meanings, of representations and of values.
17 The customs and the practices thus, 
constitute a world of calculable actions and regulated conducts, which, in turn, 
entrench and transform the natural drive to live. As man is enthralled in this 
established customs and practices, he is likewise constituted and regulated as the 
kind of man he is. In The Genealogy of Morals, for example Nietzsche writes: 
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The task of breeding an animal which is entitled to make promises 
presupposes as its condition a more immediate task, that of first making 
man to certain extent necessary, uniform, an equal among equals, regular 
and consequently calculable. The enormous labor of what I have called 
the ‘morality of custom’ – the special work of man on himself throughout 
the longest era of the human race, his whole endeavor prior to the onset 
of history, all this finds its meaning, its great justification – regardless of 
degree […].
18 
 
The genetic breeding of man, as a regulated and calculated man, through the 
morality of custom generates as well the conditions for its [genetic breeding] 
triumph. Following Foucault’s terminology, the genetic breeding which 
Nietzsche talks about is no other than a disciplinary mechanism.
19 The necessity 
to discipline or to breed man into a regulated animal and the impetus to inculcate 
obedience to custom create, in effect, an instinct to live. Eventually such instinct 
becomes the dominant drive that propels the desire to live.  
In Heidegger, the idea of concealment is much more tragic. If Nietzsche’s 
concealment is grounded upon the morality of custom, Heidegger’s concealment 
is founded upon the dogma of metaphysics.
20  Metaphysics in Heidegger’s 
understanding has forgotten the authentic truth of being. It has degenerated truth 
by focusing on things. The questions it asks are no longer questions that concern 
the truth of being. Instead, they are questions about things rather than the truth 
of being. For Heidegger, questions about things conceal the essence of truth, its 
origin and its play. The truth of being cannot simply be defined by the logic of 
things, by the questions about things – it transcends those questions in so far as 
it is a universal concept, indefinable and incomprehensible yet self-evident. 
Heidegger nonetheless recognizes that while the truth of being is self-evident, it 
has been degenerated and concealed because the questions themselves are 
misdirected and misappropriated. The task therefore of retrieving the truth of 
being in the concealment of metaphysics is to be found in an immanent 
questioning of how the questions themselves are to be formulated. It is therefore 
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an appropriation of the question concerning the question of being. In The 
Introduction to Metaphysics for example, Heidegger issues a reminder 
concerning the nature of being by returning to the Greeks. He says that the 
Greeks’ understanding of being is closely linked to an understanding of physis. 
For the Greeks, “the essent of things is physis”.
21 They understand physis as 
“emerging”, “growing”, “standing and remaining still” and “emerging into the 
light”.
22 For being to emerge and come forth into the light therefore, it must be 
sought within its association in and with nature.
23  The appropriation of the 
question of the truth of being, thus must start from things.
24  And just as 
Nietzsche is afforded the opportunity to retrieve the will to live by appropriating 
the will within a genealogy of morality, so Heidegger as well is afforded that 
opportunity to recover the truth of being by appropriating the thing, in effect, 
within the structure of questioning. 
 
4. The Pathos of the Unconcealed: Twilight of Will and Truth 
 
One might imagine, though, based on the aforementioned, a certain lament 
and sense of the tragic about the concealment of the will itself and the truth in 
things. Within the larger context of the human condition, where various sorts of 
Apollonian-Dionysian drives loom attempting to influence the will and where 
different kinds of things emerge trying to hide the truth in things, one might 
imagine still whether the pathos of the unconcealed can be possibly reversed. At 
the rate things are going within the larger context of the human condition, I am 
tempted to think, that indeed, the odds are unsympathetic. There is indeed the 
pathos of the unconcealed. What is this pathos of the unconcealed? How did it 
come to be? 
I am tempted to think that this pathos of the unconcealed in Nietzsche, traces 
its origin from the Apollonian-Dionysian divide and culminates in the genealogy 
of morals. In both The Birth of the Tragedy and On the Genealogy of Morals, I 
suspect that the will is concealed and supplanted by instinct. That the will is 
concealed is the pathos. And as the will is concealed, is its demise as well. It is 
therefore the misery of the will. 
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Nietzsche’s elaboration for example of the Apollonian-Dionysian divide 
vividly illustrates how the will is dominated by instinct. For Nietzsche, this 
following is a form of forgetting and of concealing. Akin to an animal, in either 
drives, man fails to have a sense of time, of cause, of effect or a sense of willing. 
Man’s will thus is chained and hypnotized by that moment of following either 
drives. Man acts instinctively, like an animal.
25 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra for 
example, Nietzsche writes: 
 
What is the ape to men? A laughing-stock or a painful embarrassment. 
And just so shall be to the superman: A laughing-stock or a painful 
embarrassment. You have made your way from worm to man, and much 
in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even now man is more of an 
ape than any ape.
26 
 
That man is an ape is captured by man’s being slave to either drives, unable 
to grasp the very meaning of “living as a superman”. As an ape, man’s behavior 
is governed by instinct and that is miserable – a pathos in itself. That man is 
governed by instinct is vividly illustrated too by man’s being conditioned to 
obey either the Apollonian or Dionysian drives, akin to an ape that has to be 
conditioned in order to ensure that it obeys. That man is conditioned to obey 
either drives is reflected in man’s submission to the illusions of timeless forms 
of perfections and arbitrariness of everyday existence. As man submits himself 
to such timeless forms and arbitrariness, man fails to create for himself a world 
of his own. He recognizes the Dionysian misery that lurks in his imagined sense 
of the absurdity of human existence. Yet, because of his weaknesses, the 
fragility of life, as well as its seeming meaninglessness, because of the fear of 
the unknown, he hides himself in the curtains of the Apollonian illusion. He 
refuses to create for himself a world where he affirms such misery by resisting it, 
by pushing it further, by probing its limits. For Nietzsche, this is indeed an 
embarrassment, a laughing-stock among men, even more so to the “superman”. 
One might think that following one’s instinct is quite incorrect. This is not 
simply the case with Nietzsche. The problem I think rests upon not in man’s use 
of his instinct, but rather its essential valorization at the expense of his 
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consciousness. For Nietzsche, it is instinct that drives man to resist, to break 
loose and eventually to overcome whatever pathos lurks behind, except that it 
must be in accord as well with the development of his consciousness. In The 
Gay Science for example, Nietzsche writes:  
 
Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence 
also what is most unfinished and unstrong. Consciousness gives rise to 
countless errors that lead an animal to perish sooner than necessary, 
“exceeding destiny”, as Homer puts it. If the conserving association of 
the instincts were not so very much powerful, and if it did not serve on 
the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its 
misjudgments and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness 
and its credulity – in short, of its consciousness; rather, without the 
former, humanity would long have disappeared.
27 
 
Nietzsche thus affords to instinct its due, since it has, so to speak, become a 
tour de force that forms customs, practices, communities as well as families 
necessary for human existence. But too much valorization of instinct, without its 
regulating capacity, is destructive. Without its regulating capacity, it becomes a 
dominant force, a fierce dog hiding in one’s cellars, uncritical of the timely 
experiences that might be unearthed in the arbitrariness of daily existence. 
There is also a pathos of the unconcealed in Nietzsche’s divide between the 
master and slave morality. It too is a source of the twilight of the will. As 
Nietzsche divides morality into master and slave, he as well divides the will to 
live. But the pathos does not lie in the fact that there is a divide, it lies in 
between the divide, in short, in its history. As the origin of morality arises out of 
the experiences of the masters, setting up a collection of values, rules, and goals 
which might be otherwise called noble and elite, so a will of like nature also 
arises, distinct and different. The morality of the slaves on the other hand, while 
essentially of a different type, arises out of the need to provide meaning to the 
existential predicament of suffering and lack of value. As this morality arises 
from this need, so a will of like nature also evolves, a will that is subservient to 
the other, but no less important. This fact of subservience of the will of the slave, 
nevertheless, is historically important for Nietzsche. As this will is endowed 
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with meanings shaped by its suffering, it is able to overcome the pathos of the 
unconcealed originating from the master. It is therefore a historic moment for 
Nietzsche. David Owen for example notes that “the moment of history, for 
Nietzsche, marks the possibility of the slaves overcoming these dilemmas, that 
is, the possibility of consciousness becoming reflective”.
28 And for Nietzsche, 
such possibility of reflective consciousness signals the possibility of a return to 
one’s nature as an affirmation of life. 
In Heidegger, on the contrary, the pathos of the unconcealed is difficult to 
grasp. Part of the reason perhaps arises out of the difficulty of deciphering his 
language. His distinction for example between the object of art and work of art 
risks a reader-centered hermeneutic, thereby risking as well the very purpose 
through which he has grounded his attempt of recovering the truth. The other 
part arises, I suppose, from the enormity of the task he sets for himself: the task 
of recovering being or the truth of being as a being-in-the-world-existing-
alongside-things. In as much as the tasks ahead are enormous, even if 
uncovering the pathos of the unconcealed is possible, that uncovering itself, 
forms part of the pathos. There is, in effect, already a misery ahead, a certain 
pathos of inquiry, of questioning. On the other hand, it is also this pathos that 
drives the truth to reveal itself in things. And I take it to mean the same in this 
short inquiry concerning the pathos in Heidegger’s questioning of the structure 
of the question of truth in things.  
A central theme in Heidegger’s discussion in The Origin of the Work of Art 
is his distinction between an object of art and a work of art. This distinction, I 
suppose, sets forth the context by which one might inquire about the pathos of 
that which is concealed in any work of art. The pathos, if I may, is not in the 
thing, in the ordinary sense of thing as a mere thing. It is not in the work of art 
either, in the ordinary sense of work as a mere work of art. The pathos, I am 
persuaded, rests upon “man”, and this for a number of reasons. First, man sets 
himself apart from things. Second, things are of value to him only if they are 
useful. Third, man has a tendency to overvalue things to the extent that the 
tendency becomes destructive of things. Finally, as soon as things outlived their 
value or equip-mentality, they are forgotten. In so far as man treats things in this 
manner, the pathos always lurks in things.  
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Man however, fails to grasp that in thinking about things or being conscious 
of them, he makes things the way they ought to be.
29 Things are things because 
of man. As mere things, the truth about them is concealed from us. It remains 
hidden in man’s absence, in man’s disavowal of things. They appear however 
whenever man comes before things as things ready-to-hand. When man 
transforms the presence of things into readiness, they manifest the truth about 
themselves, they appear. In such transformation, there is an “event-ation” of 
truth. The truth happens. There is an event of truth. Man invites the truth to 
come forth. It appears because something shows itself.
30 In The Origin of the 
Work of Art, Heidegger writes: 
 
The equipmental quality of the equipment was discovered. But how? Not 
by a description  and explanation of a pair of shoes actually present; not 
by a report about the process of making shoes; and also not by the 
observation of the actual use of shoes occurring here and there; but only 
by bringing ourselves before Van Gogh’s painting. This painting spoke. 
In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we 
usually tend to be.
31 
 
The pathos of the unconcealed truth thus lies in man’s failure to come before 
things and invite the truth to come forth. For Heidegger, the truth is never self-
showing. It does not appear by itself although it is there somewhere, lurking 
behind things. As it lurks in things which are otherwise ignored, it also lures 
man before it in order that it may show itself. 
 
5. The Reversal of the Pathos: A Return to One’s Essence 
 
I have tried to present, in the least, some parallel themes in Heidegger and 
Nietzsche. I am persuaded, nonetheless, that while there are striking parallelisms 
evident in their respective works, I am tempted to think as well that they are, on 
account of my presentation, not uncontroversial. Be that as it may, I shall try to 
conclude this essay with the possibility of reversal of the pathos. 
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 The possibility of reversal of the pathos is first and foremost a function of 
two opposing themes. David Owen explains this possibility of reversal within 
the context of modernity which Nietzsche himself despises. At one point, he 
says that “the modern individual has a capacity for self-reflection which rules 
out the unreflective grounding of value in social position characteristic of the 
classical noble”.
32 At another point, “the modern individual is confronted by the 
death of God as the inability authentically to accept a transcendental ground of 
value in the manner of the Christian”.
33 Given David Owen’s themes, how is this 
reversal possible with Nietzsche? 
The possibility of reversal is grounded upon Nietzsche’s teaching of the 
“Übermensch” or, independent of Nietzsche, perhaps the reversal may be 
grounded upon any will that engages its own limits by means of its own 
narrative. Although the idea of the “Übermensch” is embedded with several 
meanings, it remains nonetheless crucially important a principle for a possibility 
of reversal. In Nietzsche’s Gay Science for example, he characterizes the 
“Übermensch” as someone who “can posit his own ideal” and from such derive 
his own joys, laws and rights.
34 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra on the other, he 
characterizes the “Übermensch” as a perpetual and dynamic overcoming of the 
unknown: thus, he says, “man is something that must be overcome”.
35 Nietzsche 
however makes it explicit that the “Übermensch” is not an end but a bridge.
36 As 
a bridge, it connects things, people or the earth perhaps, in their down going or 
crossing over. It embraces all and welcomes all. It is therefore a “coming to be 
unceasingly”, amidst downfall or rising still. As a coming to be unceasingly, the 
“Übermensch” must be a friend to the earth because earth is his meaning.
37 As 
much as the earth is its meaning, it therefore carries the earth in itself. It 
embraces the earth as its own. As much as the earth is its meaning, the 
“Übermensch” has to be a strong spirit in order to bear the earth itself and the 
miseries that hide in it, its absurdities as well as its meaninglessness or perhaps 
the nausea of human existence. The “Übermensch” must also be a lion, in order 
to confront the multiple contradictions that the earth carries. As a lion, the 
“Übermensch” must be fierce enough to face the great dragon that imposes its 
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will upon the earth as the absolute norm, as an unassailable truth. The 
“Übermensch” must be a lion enough to break loose from the hold of this dragon. 
Finally, the “Übermensch” needs to possess the innocence and forgetfulness of 
the child. It must possess the child’s sense of curiosity, of wonder in order to be 
self-propelled, in order to initiate new beginnings and set things in perpetual 
motion.
38 The reversal of the pathos therefore is a return to that will to live as an 
“Übermensch”.  
To some extent however, “Übermensch” might also be construed as man’s 
“immanent critique” of the socio-political conditions where he is in – a critique 
that challenges the dominant forms of lives that are being imposed to the 
detriment of the weak. But, not simply a critique that challenges, but more so a 
critique that carries the earth as its meaning, by creating possibilities of 
connections, of communion and of solidarity to generate conditions that will 
affirm life itself. Only by affirming life itself that “Übermensch” has a meaning, 
only then that a reversal is possible. 
In Heidegger, the reversal is articulated in man’s will to set up a world that 
nourishes the earth. Quite heroic in one sense but is rather true in itself. 
Heidegger’s will to truth or his attempt of recovering the truth, I suppose, is not 
grounded upon anything, other than the truth that is due the earth (even 
Heidegger’s famous Da-sein needs the earth as a ground of possibilities and 
discoveries). How man looks upon the earth is perhaps reflective of the truth 
which man seeks to discover. 
The example set forth by Heidegger, for instance, is illustrative of this 
discovery of the truth. Man is desirous of things so long as these things are of 
value to him. Man’s truth thus lies in it. But there is more that can be unearthed 
through that example. It does not need a Heidegger or a Nietzsche. Perhaps a 
little care will do, or a sensitive common sense will make the caveat known.  
In the ordinary sense of the word, stripped of any philosophical jargon or 
semantics, the earth is man’s home. It is man’s primal abode. There is no other 
planet in the universe that can provide that home, at least, not for now. In that 
abode, man is a settler. He is the earth’s inhabitant. As a settler and inhabitant, 
he has to take care of his home, of his abode. The sense of care here, might be 
possibly viewed in many ways. Care may mean beautifying the abode or 
perhaps decorating it with things that can be found in it. Care may also mean 
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cleaning one’s abode by dusting off elements that are detrimental to it. Still, care 
may also mean preserving one’s abode through one’s intervention. A broken 
window for example may be repaired or an ailing post perhaps. In the same way, 
the earth may also be repaired by preserving it, by replacing its broken parts, by 
sustaining its nature as one’s abode. This is as easy as one might imagine. 
The problem however is not as easy as it appears. There are historical 
contingencies that are of crucial importance. First and foremost, man has learned 
a lot of technai. Secondly, man has developed technology. Finally, man has 
inherited an unequal and unjust world. These are factors affecting man’s 
disposition towards his abode – the earth. 
At the risk of cutting off the trail, man’s use of technology or man’s techne 
appropriate to technology ought to be a bringing forth of the earth in the Greeks’ 
sense of poiesis. Similar to the work of art, it is also a form of revealing or better, 
a way of revealing.
39 For Heidegger, “technology comes to presence in the realm 
where revealing and unconcealment takes place, where, aletheia, truth, 
happens”.
40  Revealing in the sense of bringing forth is thus the essence of 
technology. 
In modern technology however, such bringing forth does not occur as a 
poiesis. Instead, Heidegger laments that it challenges forth the earth 
unreasonably, demanding too much of what it is able to give. Technology thus 
expedites the earth to the brink of its destruction. It separates man from nature in 
that it sets up a world that is unfamiliar to man and eventually lures man into it. 
What is once a mountain, for example, turns into a mining field and its soil a 
source of mineral deposits.
41 Heidegger remarks that although technology is also 
a setting upon of a world, its manner of revealing is nonetheless a challenging 
forth in the sense of “Ge-stell”.
42 In the course however of this challenging-forth 
in the sense of “enframing” (ge-stell), man finds himself controlled by the 
technology he set up. He has lost that sense of control and dominion of nature in 
the sense of care and preservation. Instead, he has succumbed to that unlimited 
expedition of nature as he is driven by his own desire and need for technology. 
He thus endangers himself through technology and therefore endangers his 
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abode as well. Enframing, in this regard, “blocks the shining-forth and holding-
sway of truth” concerning technology.
43 
If such were the case, then, what ought one to do? Shall passivity or 
detachment do the thing? Or shall one heed Heidegger when he says “The closer 
we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power 
begin to shine and the more questioning we become”.
44 Is it really the case that 
“only in the precipice of destruction that one comes to realize the need to 
change”?
45 
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